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Abstract 
This paper examines the spawning of new company founders' from 124 leading 
U.S. academic institutions, using a unique database. We examine both local and non-local 
spin-offs of academic faculty members. Accordingly, the rate of spawning is positively 
affected by the institution quality, the strength of the local entrepreneurial cluster in the 
region where the institution is located, and the share of R&D expenditure financed by 
the federal government. On the other, hand the effectiveness of the university 
technology licensing office (measured by license revenues per R&D expenditure) has a 
negative impact on the rate of academic spawning. Moreover, we find evidence that after 
controlling for the entire institution rank, the rank of the business school has a positive 
and significant impact on the institution spawning rate. When comparing the local spin-
offs to non-local spin-offs we find that 42% of faculty spin-offs are created in the region 
of the academic institution. This finding contrasts the common notion that most of the 
academic spin-offs are local. Not surprisingly, we find that local cluster culture and local 
availability of VC has very limited impact on non-local academic spin-offs. Moreover, 
institution R&D expenditure and sources of R&D finance has low impact on non-local 
academic spin-offs.  
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1. Introduction  
In the current era academic institutions have multiplied mission from 
enhancing basic research and training skilled work force toward enhancing 
technology transfer through patent licensing and academic spawning of new 
innovative firms (Feldman, 2003). Therefore, boosting regional economic 
development based on strengthening local academic institutions and their 
technology transfer units is a well-accepted economic development strategy. 
Innovative start-ups play a significant role in enhancing economic growth 
(Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). This paper will focus on spin-offs from academic 
institutions and their role in regional development. 
Academic spin-offs appear to be an effective mean of technology transfer, 
leading to job creation and wealth creation (Rogers et al., 2003). Despite the 
growing literature on university role in technology transfer and regional 
economic development, there is still little systematic empirical evidence about 
the ability of academic institutions to spawn companies and the regional 
attachment of these academic spin-offs. 
A common broad definition of academic entrepreneur is an academic 
scientist who sets up a business company in order to commercialize the results 
of his/her research (Franzoni and Lissoni 2009; Roberts and Malone, 1996; 
Smilor et al., 1990; and Steffenson et al., 1999). In this view, any scientist who 
developed inventions with commercial potential is a latent academic 
entrepreneur (Franzoni and Lissoni, 2009). The main question in this paper is: 
what are the institutional attributes that transfer these latent academic 
entrepreneurs into founders of academic spin-offs? And whether these spin-offs 
tend to stay in the local region? 
This paper offers novel evidence about the spawning of founders' from 124 
leading U.S. academic institutions, by past and present faculty members. We 
develop a unique database of founders with prior work experience in 124 
leading U.S. academic institutions based on data collected from Linkedin, the 
online professional social networking tool. We examine the spawning of 
founders at both the regional and global contexts. We consider the academic 
spawning of entrepreneurs as a function of the local cluster characteristics, the 
ranking of the university and its leading faculties, the size and sources of the 
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R&D budget of the parent academic institution, and the institution's technology 
licensing office effectiveness (measured by licensing revenues per total R&D 
expenditure in the institution), after controlling for the size of the institution and 
it royalties share policy. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. University Technology Transfer 
Scientific and technological knowledge is considered to be the most 
important raw material for economic development (Mowery and Rosenberg, 
1989). The attention on the exploitation of such knowledge produced by 
academic institutions has increased in recent years (Chiesa and Piccaluga 2000). 
This dramatic increase in technology transfer efforts in the academia is 
attributed to several reasons: the emergences of biomedical research in the 
1970’s, the passage of the Bayh-Dole act in 1980, increase of academic research 
sponsored by the industry, and a change in university attitude toward 
technology transfer (Mowery et al., 2004). 
Several stages can be observed in the evolution of university technology 
transfer (Etzkowitz, 2002, 2003, 2010). In the 1980s, the passive patenting 
format was characterized by patenting in order to protect the university’s IP, 
without any significant marketing efforts. This stage of the university technology 
transfer strategy was a direct reaction to the Bayh-Dole act (Henderson, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg, 1998; Stevens, 2004). The pro-active patent' marketing format 
reflects the understanding that in order to leverage the university IP a pro-active 
search for potential users are required (Etzkowitz, 2010; Shane, 2004). As a 
result, since the early 1990s, many universities expended the scale and scope of 
their TLO activities. However, it soon became clear that in many cases, even with 
a pro-active patenting strategy, the licensing of potentially valuable patents was 
not easily achievable due to the early stage of the developments, the tacitness of 
the knowledge, and the risk profile of the inventions (Franzoni and Lissoni, 
2009; Jensen and Thursby, 2001, 2002; Jensen et al., 2003; Thursby et al., 2001, 
2005). Therefore, since the late 1990s a trend of enhancing technology transfer 




2.2. Academic spin-offs 
Patent licensing has traditionally been the dominant route for the 
commercialization of technology invented at universities and research institutes 
but in the last two decades universities do increasingly consider the creation of 
spin-offs as a way of commercializing their internal research results (Chiese and 
Piccaluga, 2000; Clarysse et al., 2001a,b; Malone, 1996; Mustar, 1995, 1997, 
2001; Roberts and Carayannis et al., 1998; Shane, 2004; Smilor et al., 1990; 
Steffenson et al., 1999; Thursby and Thursby, 2002, 2007). Since the late 1990s, 
academic spin-off, founded to exploit the university IP, have become an 
important economic phenomenon (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Siegel, 
Veugelers and Wright, 2008). In addition, following the tremendous growth in 
venture capital finance and entrepreneurial activity since the mid 1990s, the 
financial investors’ community has shown an increasing interest in academic 
spin-offs as investment opportunity (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). 
According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) 
3,376 spin-offs were created in the U.S. between 1980 and 2000 (AUTM 2001). 
In the last decade the academic spin-off rate accelerated with an average of more 
than 500 new start-ups each year, which is more than double than the average 
rate in the 1990s (AUTM, 2008). Roughly 16% of university' inventions are 
transferred to the private sector through the founding of spin-offs (AUTM, 2008). 
Academic spin-offs have been shown as an important means of transferring 
technology from academia and enhancing the national economy. The following 
roles have been attributed to academic spin-offs: boosting economic activity and 
regional development (Di Gregorio and Shane,2003; Nicolaou and Birley,2003a; 
Roberts and Malone,1996; Mian, 1997), creating new wealth and new jobs 
(Perez Perez and Sanchez, 2003; Steffensen et al., 2000; Walter etal., 2006), 
providing a strong tie between industry and science (Debackere and Veugelers, 
2005), and enhancing innovation and introduction of new commercial products 
to the marketplace (Varga, 1998). 
 
2.2.1 Academic spin-off and regional development 
Academic spin-offs may be an important mechanism for regional economic 
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development (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003). The well-known examples of new 
industrial cluster growth such as Silicon Valley in California, Route 128 in 
Massachusetts, and the Research Triangle area in North Carolina are all closely 
connected to major research universities, and this fact has been perceived as 
instrumental in positioning these regions on new, technology-intensive growth 
trajectories (Feldman, 2003). Goldman (1984) found that 72% of the high tech 
companies in the Boston area in the early 1980s were based on technologies 
originally developed at MIT laboratories. Thus, the Route 128 economic 
infrastructure might not have existed in the absence of MIT and its spin-offs, 
even though most of these spin-off companies were not based on formal 
technology licenses from MIT (Van De Velde, Clarysse and Wright 2008). 
 
The location of academic spin-offs 
Formal academic spin-offs appear be primarily local1.  In 2000, 80% of 
firms formed from university licenses operated in the state where the university 
was located (AUTM, 2001). Zhang (2007) found that 78% of university spin-offs, 
which raised VC finance between 1991 and 2001, were located at the same state 
as their parent academic institution. Investigation of 72 spin-offs from MIT 
between 1980 and 1996 (Shane, 2004) reveal that 50% are located within 20 km 
of MIT and over 70% are located less than 100 km from MIT. Egeln, Gottschalk 
and Rammer (2004) find that 66% of academic spin-offs in Germany locate 
within 50 kilometers from their university. Astebro and Bazzazian (2010) argue 
that a dominant fraction of spin-offs are located extremely close to their parent, 
within 50 km (approximately 35 miles). 
The literature presents several reasons way most of academic spin-offs are 
local. Often, an academic inventor will retain employment with the academic 
institution (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998). Moreover, even when the founder 
leaves the university to form the spin-off; he may want to use the students and 
labs of the university to engage in additional research to support the spin-off 
(Hsu and Bernstein, 1997). Further, the inventor may want to exploit his local 
networks to support the spin-off. Finally, the inventor may prefer not to move a 
                                                        
1
 This paper will present evidence that many informal academic spin-offs are actually created outside 
the region of the parent institution. 
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household as such is costly both socially and economically (Dahl and Sorenson, 
2007; Falck, Fritsch, and Heblich, 2008). However, moving may be useful if local 
conditions are not ideal for the spin-off (Egeln, Gottschalk, and Rammer, 2004). 
Moreover, for non-formal spin-off that exploit non formal university IP it may be 
better moving away from the parent institution, in order to reduce the attention 
of the institution and avoid conflict regarding the owner of the spin-off's IP. 
 
Heterogeneity in the rate of academic spin-off 
While academic spin-off became significant phenomena, its frequency 
varies significantly across different academic intuitions and different regions (Di 
Gregorio and Shane, 2003). Some universities, like MIT, routinely transfer their 
technology through the formation of new firms, while other universities, like 
Columbia University and Yeshiva University, rarely generate start-ups. 
Moreover, some regions enhance and support regional academic spin-offs such 
as Silicon Valley, Boston, and New York, while other regions has less developed 
entrepreneurial infrastructure such as East Lansing, Michigan or Providence, 
Rhode Island.  
 
2.2.2. Non-formal academic spin-offs 
While, Markman et al. (2008a) and Roberts and Eesley (2009) suggest that 
the real number of academic faculty spin-offs is actually at least twice as many as 
reported to AUTM, most research still focus only on formal academic spin-offs. 
Even when the importance of non-formal spin-offs is recognized the empirical 
investigations these spin-offs have been hindered by the lack of systematic data 
on founders who were previously employed by an academic institution. 
This paper offers novel evidence about all spin-offs from academic 
institutions. We develop a unique database of founders who worked at 124 
leading U.S. academic institutions based on data collected from LinkedIn.   
 
2.3. Academic spinoff – explanatory variables 
Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) argue that both micro and macro-level 
factors influence the decision to create a new start-up to exploit a university 
invention. At the micro-level, research has shown that the attributes of 
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technological inventions themselves (Shane, 2001a), inventors’ career 
experience (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Shane and Khurana, 2000), their 
psychological make-up (Roberts, 1991), and their research skills (Zucker et al., 
1998) influence this decision. At the macro-level, research has shown that 
technology regimes (Shane, 2001b), the strength of patent protection in a 
specific technological area (Shane, 2002), and universities’ IP and human 
resource policies (Lach and Schankerman, 2004, 2008; Goldfarb et al., 2001; 
Kenney, 1986) influence this decision. 
This paper will focus only on the effect of the macro-level factors on the 
rate at which new firms are created to exploit university inventions. These 
factors vary across universities and regions. Following we will present these 
explanatory macro-level factors and their expected influence on academic spin-
off rate. 
Prior research suggests four macro-level explanations for cross-university 
variation in academic spin-off activity including: 1) the level of development and 
the entrepreneurial culture of the region surrounding the university and the 
volume of local venture capital activity, 2) the commercial orientation and 
sponsorship of university research, 3) university and departments intellectual 
reputation, and 4) university policies and incentives structure. We will add a fifth 
variable which is the TLO effectiveness measured by commercial output per 
million dollar R&D research (i.e. license revenues). 
 
2.3.1 Established high tech cluster and local venture capital market. 
The first argument for cross-university variation in spin-off activity is the 
development of the regional cluster. Certain cultures are less entrepreneurial 
than others. Innovative high tech firms seem to flourish especially in very 
particular regional clusters of which Silicon Valley and Boston area are the 
archetypes (Lee et al., 2000; Kenney, 2000; Saxenian, 1994). Therefore, while 
some regions significantly enhance academic spin-offs, other regions may 
depress academic spin-offs. 
Location affects resources available to aid entrepreneurship and start-up 
development (Lechner and Dowling, 2003). The decision to start a new company, 
certainly, depends on local conditions such as access skilled human capital, the 
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availability of local networks that mobilize the resources essential to founding a 
new firm (Sorenson, 2003; and Stuart and Sorenson, 2003a, 2003b), the strength 
of the entrepreneurial infrastructure (Thornton, 1999), entrepreneurial culture 
and tolerance for risk and entrepreneurial activity (Audretsch and Keilbach, 
2004; Davidsson, 1995; George and Zahra, 2002; Lee et al., 2004; Mueller and 
Thomas, 2001; Thornton, 1999), and local availability of risk capital and other 
supportive services (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Saxenian, 1994; Sorenson and 
Stuart, 2001). 
The empirical literature suggests that in contrast to the rate of academic 
spin-offs in established high tech clusters, academic spin-offs in regions outside 
such clusters are rare (European Commission, 1998, 2000. In general,  
 
H1a: The more developed the cluster surrounding the university, the greater the 
rate of the university spawning. More specifically, the more entrepreneurial cluster 
surrounding the university, the greater the rate of the university spawning. 
 
One characteristic of the local cluster - availability of venture capital in the 
area - has a significant impact on cross-university variation in spin-off activity 
(Carayannis et al., 1998). In-sufficient finance is regularly cited by nascent-
entrepreneurs as a major barrier to starting a business (Volery et al., 1997; 
Kouriloff, 2000; Robertson et al., 2003; Choo and Wong, 2006). The finance and 
entrepreneurship literature have recognized venture capital as the main source 
of finance to entrepreneurship (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999). 
Universities located in geographic areas rich in venture capital are more 
likely generate spin-offs due to several reasons. First, because venture capital is a 
major source of equity financing for new technology companies, its availability is 
important to overcoming capital market barriers to the financing of new 
technology firms (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Second, in addition to providing 
capital, venture capitalists play an important role in the innovation process by 
providing valuable operating assistance to new high technology firms (Gompers 
and Lerner, 1999; Zucker et al., 1998). Third, venture capitalists serve as “market 
makers” for business development resources by connecting new technology 
companies with potential suppliers, customers, lawyers, manufacturers, and 
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employees (Florida and Kenney, 1988). Finally venture capital investments tend 
to be made locally (Chen et al., 2010; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Zook, 2002). 
Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) found no effect of local venture capital 
activity and local academic spin-off rate. Wright et al. (2007) found evidence that 
involvement of venture capitalists in university spin-offs facilitate their creation. 
Zhang (2007) found that the total venture capital investment within 50 miles is 
significantly and positively correlated with a university’s number of academic 
entrepreneurs. Therefore we argue that:  
 
H1b: The greater the availability of venture capital in the area, the greater the 
rate of the university spawning. 
 
2.3.2. The scope and oriented research. 
The second argument for cross-university variation in spin-off activity is 
the scope of the commercial orientation of university research. There is often a 
tension in the universities’ mission between basic research and the search for 
ideas with potential commercial application (Wade, 1984). In many institutions 
the basic research is considered the legitimate function, while commercial 
activity is regarded as an inappropriate focus. This situation is reflected in the 
academic reward systems, in the share of industry sponsored research and in the 
institution policy toward technology transfer (Feldman, 2003). D’Este et al., 
(2010) found that encouragement of researchers toward commercial research 
by its institution has a positive and significant impact on both inventions 
disclosure and university spin-off rate. 
Universities differ on the degree to which their researchers focus on 
industrial problems. Commercially-oriented universities receive more of their 
research budget from industry (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994) and are more 
likely to make commercially-oriented discoveries and to generate spin-offs 
(O’Shea et al., 2005; Zucker et al., 1998; Powers and McDougall, 2005). 
Blumenthal et al. (1996) found that industry funded faculty members are 
more commercially productive than those who are not industry funded. Di 
Gregorio and Shane (2003) found only limited support for the effect of the 
commercial orientation of university on its spin-off rates. Powers and McDougall 
(2005) found a positive and significant relationship between annual university 
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commercial oriented R&D expenditure and spinoff activity. O'Shea et al., (2005) 
found that both the total R&D budget of the university and the portion of funding 
that comes from the industry have positive and statistically significant impact on 
the level of university spin-offs.  
 
H2a: the greater the amount of research and development activity at the 
university, the greater the rate of spin-off activity. 
H2b: the greater the share of commercially-oriented research activity financed 
by the industry at the university, the greater the rate of spin-off activity. 
 
 
2.3.3. University Ranking & Reputation 
The third argument for cross-university variation in spawning activity is 
university quality. Highly rated universities are more likely to generate spin-offs 
for two main reasons. First, high ranked schools are more likely to employ 
leading-edge researchers and such researchers are more likely to start firms to 
exploit their inventions. Therefore, spin-offs will be more common at highly 
ranked schools (O’Shea et al., 2005; Zucker et al., 1998; Powers and McDougall, 
2005). Second, the university’s reputation makes it easier for researchers to 
raise capital for their new venture. In addition, to the general intellectual ranking 
the specific ranking of business schools can influence the level of the academic 
spin-off activity (O'Shea, Allen, Chevalier, Roche, 2005). The ranking of the 
business school might be a proxy of the institution's orientation. 
In a study of biotechnology IPOs, Stephan and Everhart (1998) found that 
the amount of funds raised and the initial stock evaluation of firms were 
positively associated with the reputation of the university-based scientist 
associated with the firm. Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) found that spin-off 
companies from top universities were more likely to attract venture capitals 
than those from less prestigious institutions. They also found that the 
university’s ranking positively influences academic spin-off rates. Di Gregorio 
and Shane (2003) found that it is easier for academics from top tier universities 
to assemble resources to create start-ups due to their increased credibility. 
O'Shea et al., (2005) found that faculty quality has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the level of university spin-off, while number of faculty and 
research student are not significant. This indicates that it is quality rather than 
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quantity of human capital resources that matters in determining university 
spinoff activity.  Zhang (2007) found that university’s research quality is the 
most significant variable in explaining the number of academic entrepreneurs 
from a university. 
 
H3a: The greater the ranking of the university, the greater the rate of spin-off 
activity. 
H3b: The greater the ranking of the technological departments of the university, 
the greater the rate of spin-off activity. 
H3c: The greater the ranking of the business school, the greater the rate of spin-
off activity. 
 
2.3.4. University policies. 
The fourth argument for cross-university variation in spin-off activity is 
that universities differ in their policies toward technology transfer and that 
those policies shift activities at the margin toward or away from start-up activity. 
The traditional literature on technology transfer from the academia 
focused on the TLO characteristics and the incentives structure to academic 
inventors. (Markman et al., 2008b; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2009; Lockett 
and Wright, 2005). The main argument is that universities that adopt certain 
policies and incentive structures could generate more spin-offs because those 
policies provide greater motivation for entrepreneurial activity by faculty 
members. 
In particular, the distribution of royalties, between inventors and the 
institutions, was found to influence the propensity of entrepreneurs to found 
firms to exploit university inventions (Lach and Schankerman, 2004, 2008; 
Lockett, Siegel, Wright, and Ensley, 2005; Shane, 2004; Lockett and Wright, 
2005). In this paper we do not focus on these issues, which were already subject 
to significant examinations and are independent of the issues we are focusing on. 
However, we do use the royalties share policy variable (Lach and Schankerman, 





Complementarities between different technology transfer mechanisms 
While the quality of the TLO is associated with higher levels financial 
rewards from technology transfer activities in general, it is not clear that it has 
the same effect on these different technology transfer instruments (patents, 
licensing, spin-offs creation, consulting and joint research agreements with the 
industry). The question of what instrument is best suited to transfer different 
pieces of knowledge has been the focus of many recent studies (Shane, 2004). 
The decision of whether or not the exploitation of a technology is best 
achieved by patent licensing or by a start-up depends on the technological 
regime and on the appropriability of the innovation. In low-appropriability 
environments, licensing may be hard and innovations may not be 
commercialized because of a lack of incentives. However, if the knowledge is also 
characterized by high tacitness, the creation of a company exploiting a scientist’s 
unique knowledge may become an effective instrument to realize the economic 
potential of the invention (Shane, 2004). 
The decision on the instrument used to commercialize the innovation is 
also related to the professionalization of the TLO. When the TLO is professional 
and experience in proactive licensing marketing, the scientist might prefer to 
stay completely devoted to his academic work, without risking his potential 
economic reward. However, if the scientist believes that the TLO staff would not 
be able to commercialize his innovation, he might choose, against his natural 
preference, to create a startup to exploit his invention. In support of this view, 
Etzkowitz (2010) suggest that in the case of Stanford University the great 
financial success in licensing reduced the motivation of scientists to 
commercialize their research through spinoffs. 
 
H4: After controlling for total R&D expenditure and royalties share policy, the 
greater the success in licensing of the university, the lower the rate of spin-off 
activity. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
AUTM annually surveys university TLOs to obtain information related to 
patenting, licensing, and start-up firm activity. AUTM has collected data 
regarding university spin-off activity since 1994. However, Markman et al. 
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(2008a) suggest that the real number of academic spin-offs is actually twice as 
many as reported to AUTM. Moreover, Roberts and Eesley (2009) 
comprehensive report on MIT spin-off presented a clear picture that the number 
of spin-off reported by AUTM is an underestimation of faculty spin-offs. 
Therefore, our dependent variables are counts of present and previous 
faculty members which founded new start-up companies, collected from 
Linkedin. We use two set of regressions for estimating local and global spin-off 
by faculty members. In our sample of 124 leading U.S. universities we have 
12,799 faculty spin-offs compared with less than 7,500 spin-offs indicated in 
AUTM data in the last three decades (see AUTM 2001, 2009). Moreover, in our 
extended sample which includes the 305 institutions in the AUTM database we 
capture more than 22,000 faculty spin-offs (our sample is limited to 124 
institutions due to limitation in the availability of other variables). 
 
Dependent variable - founders' data 
Data on founders was collected from Linkedin. This online social network 
profiles over 90 million members at January 2011. It is a professional network 
which includes more than 525,000 entrepreneurs worldwide and 300,000 
entrepreneurs in the U.S. and almost 2,000,000 different companies (30% in the 
U.S.) from all sectors. Our sampling frame includes 124 academic institutions 
which reported to AUTM all the relevant information and that are ranked at the 
U.S. News rank of best national universities. We collected data on the individuals 
who had founded companies and were in the past or are currently faculty 
members of each of the 124 academic institutions in our sample. 
 
Table 1: Faculty spin-offs - Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable  Mean % Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Local current and past faculty founders 43.12 42% 75.06 0 489 
Non-local current and past faculty founders 60.10 58% 79.94 2 494 
Total current and past faculty founders 103.22 100% 146.81 2 943 
 
We rely on an innovative data collection procedure (see Avnimelech and 
Feldman, 2010, 2011). Each member in Linkedin provides a professional profile 
that includes present and past work experience. While there is always a chance 
that a member will present incorrect information, there is incentive to report 
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correctly because each profile is verified by other Linkedin members. This 
transparency may yield data, which is more accurate than survey data2. 
Box 1 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. Local 
spin-offs are defined as located within 35 mile radius from the parent institution. 
This is consistent with the finding about the radius of venture capital and 
business angel investments from their offices (see Lerner, 1995; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999; Harrison and Mason, 1996, Wetzel, 1983).  We can see that oppose 
to the common argument there are more non-local academic spin-offs than local 
ones. In our sample, 42% of the academic spin-offs are located in the region of 
the parent academic institution. 
 
Box 1: Variables Description 
Variable Name Variable Description Source 
Non-Local Faculty 
Founders  
Number of non-local founders spawned from a specific 
academic institution by past or present faculty members 
Linkedin 
Faculty Founders 35M 
Number of founders spawned locally (35 mile) from a specific 
academic institution by past or present faculty members 
Linkedin 
FT_EQ Count of full time equivalent faculty for 2008 IPEDS 
Royalties Share 




R&D Expenditure The total R&D expenditure (average 2003-2007) AUTM 
% Federal 
Government 
The share of the R&D expenditure in the institution financed by 
the federal government 
WebCaspar 
% Industry 
The share of the R&D expenditure in the institution financed by 
the industry 
WebCaspar 
% Local Government 
The share of the R&D expenditure in the institution financed by 




The share of the R&D expenditure in the institution financed by 
the institution itself 
WebCaspar 
Share R&D sponsored 
by Other sources 
The share of the R&D expenditure in the institution financed by 




The total R&D expenditure in U.S. dollars (average 2003-2007) AUTM 
Disclosures per R&D* 
Number of invention disclosures (average 2003-2007) per 1M$ 
R&D expenditure 
AUTM 
Patents per R&D* 
Number of patent applications (average 2003-2007) per 1M$ 
R&D expenditure 
AUTM 
License per R&D 
Number of license agreement (average 2003-2007) per 1M$ 
R&D expenditure 
AUTM 
License' Revenues per 
R&D* 
Total revenues granted from license (average 2003-2007) per 
1M$ R&D expenditure 
AUTM 
Local VC Partners 
Number of local VC partners located at the radius of 35 mile 
from the institution for 2010. 
Linkedin 
Cluster_35M 
The count of entrepreneurs in the region (35 miles) of the 




The score of the entire institution (and of each department 
including engineering, computer science, medical and biotech) U.S. News Report 
National 
Universities 
Rankings (2009)  
Business Ranking 
(score) 
The score of the business school 
Tech Ranking (score) 
The average score of the engineering, medical, computer 
science, and biotechnology departments 
* Used only in the robustness tests. 
                                                        
2
 We conducted comprehensive robustness of entrepreneurs data presented in Linkedin (Avnimelech 
and Feldman, 2010a). 
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Independent variables 
Data for independent variables were obtained from a variety of sources, 
including ATUM annual surveys, venture capital databases from the National 
Venture Capital Association (NVCA), the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) database, WebCaspar site and Lach and Schankerman 
(2004)3.  Box 2 provides a summary of each variable and its source. Table 2 
present the descriptive statistics of these variables. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FT_eq 124 6792.210 4526.649 104 23796 
Royalities_Share 124 0.43 0.1332 0.20 0.97 
Univ_score 124 42.234 29.237 0 100 
MBA_score 124 27.524 34.792 0 100 
Tech_score 124 32.012 25.168 0 93.25 
Cluster_35 124 2702.202 5073.971 1 22035 
VC_partners 124 98.903 208.913 0 1051 
RD_exp 124 250M 247M 8.4M 1,520M 
Licenses_Revenues Per R&D 124 0.042 0.148 0 1.47778 
Share_federal 124 59.656 14.766 29 90.9 
Share_local 124 7.738 7.999 0 43.8 
Share_industry 124 6.264 6.359 0.3 48.5 
Share_institution (Omitted) 124 21.037 12.437 0 56.8 
Share_other 124 5.668 3.849 0 18.2 
 
The size of the entrepreneurial cluster: As an index of the size of the local 
entrepreneurial cluster we used the number of entrepreneurs in the 35 miles 
radius from the academic institution in question. This information was gathered 
from Linkedin data. In order to prevent causality problems we excluded the 
number of the institution's spin-offs in this index we use in regressions. Table 3a 
group this variable to three groups and present descriptive statistic regarding 
these groupings.  
 
Table 3a: Cluster Size and Institution spin-offs - Descriptive Statistics 
Cluster Group  Cluster Size % from Institution T. Spin-offs % Local Institution  Rank 
Small Clusters 
 
59.8 24% 59.6 21% 32.2 
Mid Clusters 521.4 5% 66.3 39% 34.4 
Large Clusters 7709.0 2% 184.7 54% 60.2 
 
                                                        
3
 We want to Thank Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman for letting us use their data on royalties share 
policy. 
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Venture capital availability: As an index of the venture capital availability in 
different locations, we counted the number of venture capital partners in the 35 
miles radius from the academic institution in question. This information was also 
gathered from Linkedin data. 
University Ranking:  As an index of university reputation we used the 
academic rating score of U.S. News rank colleges and universities for the year 
2009 (U.S. News & World Report, 2009). We used the score for the entire 
university, the average score of the leading technology departments and of the 
business school score. Table 3b group this variable to three groups and present 
descriptive statistic regarding these groupings.  
 
Table 3b: Institution rank and spin-offs - Descriptive Statistics 
Institution  Cluster Size T. Spin-offs % Local spin Institution Rank MBA Rank 
Low Rank 1390.7 38.9 33% 8.4 2.7 
Mid Rank 2187.3 79.6 38% 44.5 20.7 
High Rank 4671.6 191.7 44% 73.7 59.3 
 
R&D expenditure: R&D expenditure data was collected from AUTM 
database for each institution. As a proxy to the commercial orientation of 
university research increased we used the sources of R&D finance (following Di 
Gregorio and Shane, 2003). This data was gathered from WebCaspar site. 
Complementarily between different TLO's instruments: In order to evaluate 
the complementarily effect of the strength of the TLO licensing activity on the 
rate of spin-off formation, we collected data on the number of licenses and the 
revenues generated from licenses in the university. Both figures are reported by 
the AUTM annual reports4. 
Institution size: the number of faculty members, should have significant 
impact on the spin-off rate. This information was gathered from the National 
Center for Education Statistics (The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS)). 
 
                                                        
4
 Gregorio and Shane (2003) suggested that both variables can be used as control variables. Licenses 
and option agreements capture the production of technology that is of interest to the private sector. As a 
result, using this control for inventive output, we capture only idea that has commercial potential.  By 
controlling for revenues generated data we can control for inventions with significant commercial 
potential that can justify start-up creation. 
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Tables 4 provide a correlation matrix for the variables used in the 
regression. There is a strong correlation between the number of entrepreneurs 
and the number of VC partners in a cluster; therefore we do not use these 
variables together in the regressions. There is also a strong correlation between 
the ranks of the different scientific departments thus we do not use them 
together in a regression and instead we use their average score. Similarly, we see 
that R&D expenditure is highly correlated to the average rank of the 
technological departments; therefore we do not use them together in the 
regression. Finally, there is very high correlation between the different 
performance indexes of the TLOs, therefore we use only the aggregate license' 
revenues. In the other variables used in the regressions there is no evidence of 
strong multicolinearity.    
 




We are able to discern only that an individual is currently or was 
previously employed at the parent institution and subsequently founded a new 
start-up company. We lack precise data on the year the new company was 
created, prohibiting time series modeling or the specification of a causal model. 
The data only allow a test of the association between characteristics of the 
academic institution and the rate of local and non-local spin-off' founders. 
The dependent variables in our regressions are the number of faculty 
members that founded a startup company. Our model is estimated separately for 
local founders, defined as those within a 35-mile radius of the focal university 
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and all founders.  The dependent variable for the local faculty founder regression 
has a mean of 43.12 and a standard deviation of 75.06. The dependent variable 
for the non-local faculty founder regression has a mean of 60.10 and a standard 
deviation of 79.94. These dependent variables are count variables of rare events, 
banded by zero and the distribution of these variables is over-dispersed, with 
each standard deviation larger than the corresponding mean. We used as a 
baseline the Negative Binomial and Poisson regression techniques (as a 
robustness test we also performed an OCS regression). The Poisson distribution 
assumes that the mean and variance of the process are equal. This assumption is 
violated when over-dispersion of the dependent variable is observed. The 
negative binomial model provides a solution to the problem of a skewed 
distribution by assuming a gamma distribution for the conditional mean of the 
dependent count variable and therefore allows the conditional mean and 
variance to vary (Hilbe, 2007). A goodness-of-fit test partially rejected the 
Poisson distribution assumption. These results indicate that the negative 
binomial is the appropriate model to use in the estimation. Assuming 
unobserved heterogeneity is randomly distributed across corporations and 
establishments we use a random effect maximum likelihood model (Hausman et 
al., 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Allison and Waterman, 2002). 
 
6. Empirical results 
 Tables 5a-5b and 7a-7b present the empirical results of the Poisson 
regressions, considering local and non-local faculty spin-offs. Tables 6a-6b and 
8a-8b present the empirical results of the Negative Binomial regressions, 
considering local and non-local faculty spin-offs.  
Model 1 in all tables considers the impact of the university rank on the 
number of spin-offs, controlling for university size. The results indicate that the 
university quality has a positive and statistically significant effect on spawning.  
This effect is larger for local spin-offs.  These results suggest that higher ranked 
universities spawn more founders. These results are similar to the findings of Di 
Gregorio and Shane (2003). 
Model 2 in all tables considers the impact of the technology departments' 
average ranking and the rank of the business school on the number of spin-offs. 
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The results suggest that the rank of the business school has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on spawning, controlling for technology 
department average rank (or university rank). The results indicate that 
universities with high quality technical programs and highly ranked business 
schools spawn more founders.   
Models 3 and 4 in all tables consider the impact of the local cluster (e.g. 
level of entrepreneurship activity and number VC partners' active in the region 
of the parent institution) on spawning.  The results suggest that both variables 
have positive and statistically significant impact on spawning. Not surprisingly, 
this effect is mostly relevant for local academic spin-offs.  However, it has some 
limited impact also on non-local academic spin-offs, probably due to cultural 
effects of being employed in an institution surrounded by an entrepreneurial 
cluster. 
Models 5 and 6 in all tables consider the impact of the scope and the 
orientation of the R&D expenditure (e.g. total size of R&D expenditure and the 
sources of their finance) on spawning. The results suggest that the size of the 
R&D budget has a positive and statistically significant impact on local and non-
local spawning. Moreover, federal-government sponsored R&D has a positive 
and statistically significant impact on local and non-local spawning. However, 
industry sponsored R&D has a small positive and statistically significant impact 
on local spawning, and negative impact on non-local spawning. A small positive 
and marginally significant impact exists also with local government sponsored 
research. These results are similar to the findings of Di Gregorio and Shane 
(2003). These effects are smaller and less significant for non-local spin-offs. 
Models 7 and 8 in all tables consider the impact of the effectiveness of the 
TLO measured by the license' revenues per R&D expenditure (in model 8 we also 
control for the royalties' share policy of the institution). The results suggest that 
more effective the TLO is in licensing, the lower the rate of spawning of the 
institution. These results are statistically significant. This suggests effective TLOs 
actually lower the incentives of researchers to create a spin-off. The royalities' 




Tables 5a: Poisson estimation of local faculty spawning – Models 1-4 
 
 




Tables 6a: Negative Binomial estimation of local faculty spawning – Models 1-4 
 
 




Tables 7a: Poisson estimation of non-local faculty spawning – Models 1-4 
 
 
Tables 7b: Poisson estimation of non-local faculty spawning – Models 5-8 
 
 
Tables 8a: Negative Binomial estimation of non-local faculty spawning – Models 1-4 
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Tables 8b: Negative Binomial estimation of non-local faculty spawning – Models 5-8 
 
 
7.  Conclusion and Discussion  
Regional entrepreneurial cluster development policies have become widely 
used by policy makers all over the world. One common government initiatives in 
the early stages of such cluster development process is strengthening the local 
academic institutions. Research universities provide scientific knowledge, 
technical information, and skilled workers—the basic raw material for local 
high-technology clusters (Raymond, 1996; Florida, 2002). One means of enhance 
these benefits is through creation of spin-off companies (Clayman and Holbrook, 
2003). For example, graduate student startups and faculty member spin-offs 
were part of the development of Silicon Valley's successful high tech cluster 
(Saxenian, 1994; Zagnoli, 1991). 
The objective of this paper is to bring new evidence to the analysis of 
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academic spawning. We provide a unique data source of the number of founders 
who were previously employed at one of the 124 U.S. academic institutions in 
our sample, based on the professional social networking site Linkedin and data 
from AUTM. 
 
Table 9a: Estimation of local faculty spawning 
 
 
Table 9b: Estimation of non-local faculty spawning 
 
Tables 9a and 9b summaries the results of the Poisson, Negative Binomial 
and OLS models. Accordingly, spawning is a function of university ranking, the 
business school ranking and R&D expenditures, after controlling for institution 
size (number of full time equivalent employees). In addition, academic spawning 
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is a function of the entrepreneurial and venture capital activity in the region 
where the academic institution is located (at least at the local regressions). 
Finally, the effectiveness of the university licensing activity has a negative impact 
on spawning and royalties/equity share policy has a positive impact on 
spawning. 
The paper's main policy implications for the academic institutions are that 
high quality technological faculties are not enough to facilitate academic 
entrepreneurship; rather a strong entrepreneurial business school is also 
required. Moreover, the institutions must understand the tradeoff between 
licensing activity and spin-off activity. The broader implication of this study for 
policymakers suggests that simply strengthening the academic institutions in the 
region would not be efficient for knowledge-based regional development, rather 
a dual focus strategy should be used – both strengthening the local academic 
institutions and increasing the absorptive capacity of the region for ideas 
originated from the local academic institutions and creating a more 
entrepreneurial culture that can support local academic spin-offs. 
 
Table 10: Total institution spinoffs and share of founders in the local cluster 
originated from the local academic institution  
T.  Spin-offs from  the institution / 















31 69 101 20% 32% 20% 
Mid Clusters 33 77 168 6% 7% 9% 
Large Clusters 54 93 300 2% 2% 2% 
 
Moreover, as can be seen from Table 10 in large mature high tech clusters the 
local academic institution has an insignificant direct role in startup creation 
regardless of the institution quality. In small pre-emerging clusters the academic 
institutions has a very significant role. However, the most suitable institutions in 
such clusters are mid ranked, which on one hand create high quality 
entrepreneurs but on the other had do not have the reputation to succeed 
elsewhere. In medium emerging cluster the most suitable institutions in such 
clusters are high ranked, which can help the cluster reach the next phase of 
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